EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS ON SYRIA CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS

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ABSTRACT

During a decade of armed conflict in Syria, The United Nations has taken different measures to control this crisis. Despite these measures, there is a considerable gap between the unbounded consequences of conflict and The United Nations' measures. In investigating The United Nations failure, considering The United Nations as an "organization" –an evident and forgotten reality- is often neglected by researchers. Based on Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy The United Nations as a complex bureaucracy should have the maximum effectiveness. Weber' ideal type of bureaucracy is an abstract model that can be utilized for comparing efficiency of a bureaucratic organization. The main research question is finding effective Organizational factor(s) on decision-making system of The United Nations on the subject of Syria crisis management. The current study, first, aimed at discovering ideal objectives of The UN, then finding effective Organizational factors on the crisis management via qualitative evaluation. Based on the findings, conflict in informal organization, oligarchic structure of formal organization and increase in complexity in operational environment of organization caused displacement (deviation) in organizational objectives. Delay in actions, inadequacy of responses to stages of the crisis, ineffective field monitoring, and inability to delegitimizing of unilateral destructive measures by members of the UN, all are results of this deviation in objectives that hinder efficiency of the organization to manage the crisis.

Key Words: Syria crisis, The United Nations, Crisis management, Ideal bureaucracy, Organizational decision-making

1. INTRODUCTION

Nearly 400000 killed [1], 1.5 Million people with permanent disability [2], more than 11 million displaced people, internally displaced persons and refugees [3], and $226 billion dollars' economic loss [4] caused by armed conflict in Syria has traced a dreadful image before world community especially researchers of Middle East studies that is required to be studied. When such an armed conflict with such damages occurs, inevitably The UN is focused on as the only universal reference for peace-keeping. Based on The UN's experiences and the Charter over several decades, the UN has acquired a good reputation in the international system due to peace-keeping and peace-making. In Syrian civil war, from the first Secretary-general's reaction and concerns about internal events in Syria until now (a decade of conflict) the UN has taken some measures including issuing resolution in General Assembly and Security Council, selecting emissaries to mediate, issuing statements by secretary-general, aiding and establishing research commissions. Despite all these measures, there is a considerable gap between unbounded consequences, especially humanitarian access, and measures of The UN [5] [6]. Secretary-general of The UN deplored the ineffectiveness of The UN on the crisis in Syria, it is a bitter confession [7]. What are the reasons for such a weak effect by The UN?

For analyzing and finding an answer to this question, several researches have been done. Generally, studies on reasons of inefficiency of used mechanisms by The UN to control the crisis in Syria can be categorized in three groups: 1. researches investigating structure, 2. researchers investigating crisis, and 3. settlement practice-based researches. In the first category of research, inefficiency of The UN about the crisis in Syria is obviously based on way of decision-making in the Security Council and unbalanced distribution of power, especially veto right [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]. Regardless of triggers for crisis formation, in such an analytical research, the Security Council as pillar of decision-maker has challenged The UN for achieving its goals. Such researches are close to realistic researchers' ideas on the authenticity of national interests against international organizations [14]. On the other side, such researches are more conflict-oriented than organization-oriented. About Syria crisis, long-standing sectarianism, one-party state, multiplicity of conflict parties, presence of non-state actors (such as terrorist groups), intervention of neighboring countries, direct intervention of trans regional powers, high rate of violence, dispersion of opponents' objectives has made crisis complicated and caused measures taken by The UN be less successful [15] [16]. Besides two mentioned categories, some researches have been done on technical and methodological

problems in Syria crisis management. In such studies, decrease in credit and influence of international mediators have been considered as the main problem [17] [18].

In the current study, it is believed that the organizational nature of this international organization has been disregarded in done studies. Organizational structure of The UN has differentiated it from political mechanisms. It should be noted that in contemporary history of diplomacy, several mechanisms have been set up to establish political order and peace in international relations (The Congress of Vienna, 1815; The Paris Conference, 1856; The Congress of Berlin, 1878, and The Hague Conventions in 1899, 1907), but none of them was established as an organization. As Etzioni [19] has stated we are born in organizations, educated in organizations, and most of us spend much of our lives working in organizations, thus achieving a mechanism to establish peace cannot be followed out of organizational bureaucratic discipline. Analyzing the rate of realization of organization ideal goals and recognizing effective features on it can help us to analyze The UN reactions to the crisis in Syria. The main hypothesis of the current study is based on this fact that The UN is a "complex bureaucratic organization". In Weber's ideal model a bureaucratic organization has features such as specialization, hierarchy, rationality, independency, continuation of tasks and reward and punishment mechanisms. Therefore, in pursuit of its objectives in Syrian civil war, The UN should function perfectly in the framework of Weber's ideal model. The current study aimed at recognizing these objectives and analyzing effective factors on following them.

2. Methodology

For analyzing functions of The UN, the crisis in Syria has been considered as "the Organization's domain". In fact, scope of an Organization's domain consists of activities that organization tends to follow and having mutual dependency with the organization environment [20]. Whereas recognizing features of crisis in Syria like organization operating environment is effective in evaluating crisis management by The UN, first political and legal dimensions of crisis are investigated. After comprehending characteristics of crisis utilizing conceptual framework "Ideal model" by Max Weber, ideal objectives which should be achieved are recognized. Weber's ideal bureaucracy is the perfect type of organizational logic that is rational inevitably [21], it will be an alternative to compare and study a bureaucratic structure such as The UN [22]. According to Weber's ideal model, an organization characterized by coordination, accuracy, quickness, predictability, obedience, impartiality, and costs in high levels of rationality and operation [23]. In Weber's methodology, conceptual framework of "Ideal Model" provides the base for comparing reality to an ideal bureaucracy [24], according to him, this "ideal bureaucracy" do not exist in reality, but rather represents a selective reconstruction of the real world [25]. It should be noted that the ideal model of bureaucracy can be exclusive for each organization based on its form and defined goals.

After identifying organization objectives, evaluating measures and their effectiveness is dealt with. Measuring an organizational effectiveness and determining a criterion is always difficult and ambiguous [26] [27] especially when an organization has different domains of activities and multiple objectives [28]. Accordingly, assessing the effectiveness of The UN as a very complex bureaucracy that engages in a diverse range of objectives will be more difficult. On the other hand, this fact that organizational effectiveness is an abstract idea makes quantification of measurement indices difficult (at least in comparison to business organizations that their objectives are usually measurable). To avoid this problem qualitative assessment of the crisis is considered. The extent to which organizational goals are achieved determines the effectiveness of an organization. Ideal goals in Syrian civil war are those which will be pursued and achieved if the organization is in its ideal state based on characteristics of crisis.

3. Recognizing dimensions of Syria crisis

According to Etzioni [29], goals are a source of organization legitimacy and a justifier to its activities, that is interpreted as organizational competence in law of international organizations. Undoubtedly organizations organize their activities in line with their objectives but in addition to official goals, organizational needs and requirements determine the driving force of activities [30]. Accordingly, specified competencies in statute of the organization cannot be a complete basis for recognizing authorization, a bureaucratic structure such as The UN cannot be planned to encompass all possibilities. Therefore, field and legal characteristics of the Syria crisis is of high importance. By identifying dimensions of the organization operating environment ideal objectives of organization can be identified, too.

Field dimensions: If uncertainty, urgency of reaction, and threatening values seriously [31] were considered as main features of a crisis, the long-lasting crisis in Syria would be recognized from the first stage of protests in July, 2011. According to Michael Brecher [32] field dimensions of crisis in Syria can be identified in four levels including onset (pre-crisis), Escalation (crisis), de-escalation (end of crisis), and impact (post-crisis).

In the first level, political structure of Syria that has formed based on hegemony of Baath party, power aggregation in Al-Assad family, Alawite sectarianism, and secularism based on Arab socialism [33] [34] [35] has led to political blockage. What was mentioned, along with widespread corruption and economic inefficiency [36], shaped the protests in the context of the Arab Spring waves. Increase in tensions and expansion of violence occurred in the second level. Growing polarization in Syria owing to existence of a partly considerable social basis of Baath party in cities such as Damascus (unlike Libya and Tunisia) [37], widespread support of combatants by international and trans regional powers and formation of multinational terrorist groups [38] all led to increase in crisis and tensions. Increase in costs of crisis for parties involved,

gradual and collective understanding on harmful consequences of conflict can provide the background for the third level of crisis [39]. By changing in priorities of international actors from removal of Bashar al-Assad to fight against terrorism (influenced by terrorist attacks in Europe) [40] situation has altered. Ceasefire and de-escalation zones in Syria presented by Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Astana talks and operating agreement between The U.S.A and Russia was an inflection point in the relative decline of the crisis. Despite decrease in tensions, long-term consequences of the crisis appeared in the middle of the conflict. These consequences will last even after a decline in crisis, this is the last level of the crisis. The crisis has damaged the country dramatically [41] [42]. Legitimacy crisis, collapse of social cohesion, severe decline in social capital, losses to the agricultural and industrial sectors, unemployment, budget deficit, increase in external debt, international sanctions, and collapse of infrastructure network all made Syria a failed state.

From the perspective of international law, based on The Geneva Convention (1949), What is going on in Syria is a non-international armed conflict [43] [44] [45]. High intensity of conflict due to extensive use of weapons (light and heavy), even unconventional chemical weapons in the form of organized forces (state and rebellious ones) accompanied by spiritual element, inclination to downfall of current political system, territorial dominance, and continuity of field realities all prove occurrence of a non-international armed conflict. In addition to field evidence, international organizations declaration and statements on crisis in Syria in 2012 confirm occurrence of non-international armed conflict [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] and "civil war" phrase has been often utilized in mentioned statements (Fig.1).


Fig. 1: **Political characteristics of Syria (Operating environment of organization)**

Drawn by the author

4. Ideal objectives of The UN regarding crisis in Syria

Considering above-mentioned characteristics, does The UN has competence to handling the conflict? Based on clear terms of The UN charter, the organization is liable to international peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, it is not responsible for keeping civil peace. In the seventh clause of article II of The UN charter, permission to interfere in civil affairs has not been given to The UN. According to mentioned political-legal characteristics of crisis in Syria and ideal model of bureaucracy the answer is negative.

4.1. The UN charter and necessity of preventive diplomacy

If preventive diplomacy is defined as "to prevent cause, exacerbation, and spread of conflicts" [51], it can be seen that it is referred to clearly in The UN charter. In chapter VI of The UN charter settlement mechanisms and preventing disputes have been paid heed to by the founders, and have been supported by many resolutions such as resolution of the General Assembly in A/RES/47/120, 1993. Based on mentioned political characteristics, spreading violence to neighboring countries [52], and interference of several international actors, Syrian crisis can be suspected of being an international crisis more than each civil conflict.

Ceasing the drastic conflict or decreasing it in the shortest possible time is vital and a priority for The UN. preventive diplomacy, in fact, is utilizing the maximum of organization capacity to prevent formation, expansion, and spillover of conflicts. Although the Security Council is liable to maintain peace, there are other sections in The UN that are competent to deal with preventing the conflicts (such as the Secretary-General). According to the statute of organization, peace-keeping and preventing conflicts in Syria in the form of preventive diplomacy will be of important ideal objectives of The UN.

4.2. Organization's competency to deal with Third State responsibility

Although logistic and financial aids of foreign countries to involved parties lonely does not make the conflict international, this issue does not abdicate Third States responsibility in occurrence of committed crimes by supported groups. From commencing the Syrian uprising, some regional and trans regional countries have taken measures to support involved armed forces. These measures contained logistic, intelligence, financial and armed support and also instructed opposing armed forces [53] [54]. By such support, these countries violated clause VII, article II of The UN charter, that is non-intervention in domestic affairs of countries, and also resolution 1970 of the General Assembly, A/RES/2625 on principles of international laws about friendly relations and cooperation among states.

Referring to these principles, in Nicaragua case, the international court of Justice stated by supporting opposing forces The U.S.A has violated its international commitments to not interfere in domestic affairs of other countries and prohibited use of force [55] [56].

On the other hand, responsibility of such countries can be outlined in the light of articles 8 and 16 on states responsibility and common article in Geneva Conventions 1949 for their taken measures and violating human rights and humanitarian law committed by opposing armed forces supported by them. Based on this fact, both the General Assembly and Security Council have paid attention to cooperation of Third states in violating international laws in non-international crises. Resolutions in 1966, S/RES/232 and 1968 S/RES/465 on countries assistance to the racist regime in South Rhodesia, resolution of the General Assembly in 1980, S/RES/465 on third states responsibility for aiding illegal construction in Israel, recommendation of General Assembly in 1982, RES 37/185 (XVIII) to countries about avoiding armed assistance to involved forces in Guatemala are some instances. Therefore, based on The charter, Geneva Convention 1949, the decisions of international court of justice and also the UN, it is obvious that as one of its objectives to control the crisis in Syria, The UN should deal with the role of third states in violating international laws in Syria.

4.3. Organization competency, discourse of human rights

Systematic violation of basic rights granted to citizens is one exclusive feature of conflict in Syria [57]. Systematically destroying cultural, historical, and holy sites [58] by armed forces especially extremist groups such as ISIS has increased war crimes suspicion. For example, using children in war, forcibly transferring of minorities, purposeful massacre of ethnic groups such as Syrian Kurds, privileging sexual slavery, blind attacks (not separation of citizens and military) by Chlorine, destruction of monuments such as Palmyra and similar crimes show the deteriorating human rights situation [59]. Based on humanitarian law and rules of international criminal court and also customary international laws all mentioned measures are considered as war crimes without a legal justification.

Regardless of this issue, if there are enough legal claims to a preemptive war for utilizing chemical weapons, intervention or responsibility to protect principle in Syria or not, this is a fact that The UN is competent to deal with this violation. Although this conflict by such dimensions of humanitarian rights violation cannot be considered as an international conflict, it should be dealt with internationally. About exclusive competency of states, the Permanent Court of International Justice has paid attention to environment and predominant discourse and believes that responding to this problem is possible just by paying attention to special situations of international relations [60]. Given the strength of human rights and humanitarian law discourses, as well as the high level of violence against fundamental rights and regarding to Syrian failed state, the UN has competence to deal with the crisis based on the charter, humanitarian rights, and customary international law such as "The Martens Clause". Based on above-mentioned materials, it can be said The UN is competent to deal with the crisis in Syria. Accordingly facilitating and providing conditions for national discourses, delegitimizing of unilateral measures by

Third states, fact-finding on violation of armed conflicts laws, helping refugees are a part of The UN competencies in Syrian civil war that make intervention possible. Restoration of peace and peace-keeping that had bed founders' goals of the organization can be posed as the organizational ultimate goal (Fig.2).

Facilitating the situation for National dialogues	Delegitimizing of unilateralism by third states
	Ideal peace in Syria	
Fact-finding on human rights and humanitarian law violators	Aiding refugees

Fig. 2: Ideal objectives of The United Nations in Syria crisis

5. Qualitative evaluation of the crisis management

After recognizing ideal objectives of The UN, evaluation of crisis management is discussed. Crisis management is a complicated subject, it depends on identifying hazardous phenomenon, occurrence processes and analyzing its roots [61]. Based on the crisis characteristics, qualitative evaluation of crisis management in Syria should be done. It is obvious that The UN does not have a potential power (competence) in the pre-crisis stage due to the fundamental principle of national sovereignty to deal with the crisis. What is outlined here is a reactive model. Measures have been taken by The UN after commencing and during the crisis. According to characteristics of Syrian civil war, managing different levels requires realization of two factors:1) immediacy in decision-making, and 2) adequacy of reaction. It should be noted that adequacy of reactions is achieved by realization of two factors: A) continuous monitoring of field condition and then B) controlling effective force in the crisis.

5.1. The UN: Urgency in Response

By a chronological view on events and observing reactions of The UN it can be found out that the first practical and effective decisions have been made by The UN during the second year of civil war. In the first months, except a resolution enacted by the Human rights council concerning establishing "Fact-finding committee on violation of human rights in Syria", no practical actions have been done by other sections. accordingly, not only the organization has not reacted to the crisis in the most optimum time but it has dropped behind other international organizations. To be compared, during this year, organizations such as The European Union and The Arab League have taken diverse range of diplomatic and coercive measures including imposition of an arms embargo, targeted sanctions against Syrian leaders [62], sanctions on oil shipping [63], sanctions on Syria central bank [64] offer to mediate and Arab peace initiative [65], and suspension of membership in The Arab League [66].

Although during the first year of civil war, the Security Council influenced by Arab Spring protests held continuous meetings on the special condition of the Middle East only in four meetings out of 23 meetings held by the Security council regarding Arab Spring was dealt with Syrian conflict in 2011. These four meetings included a press release, two reports on Syria conditions and a draft resolution by Morocco that was not put to a vote [67]. The UN reacted to Syria crisis in Spring 2012 by enacting resolution 2024 by Security Council, appointment of Kofi Annan as Joint special envoy of The UN to Syria, enacting resolution on human rights condition in General Assembly. Human dimensions of Syria civil war became worse in practice during this delay in action. According to reports of The UN high commissioner during the first two months the number of killed people from 700 [68] reached to more than 5000 killed people [69], during this time 600000 people became homeless and refugee [70].

5.2. The UN: Measuring adequacy in reaction

After the immediacy factor, adequacy in reaction is a basis for evaluating crisis management. Although since the second year of the crisis, The UN was involved in the Syria crisis, there was a considerable distance between field realities and The UN decisions. Most decisions of Security Council regarding the crisis included subjects such as disarming Syrian's chemical weapon, creating research mechanism on chemical attacks, terrorism financing, access to humanitarian aids, and keeping cultural monuments. A considerable part of resolutions content focus on issues that are of secondary importance. It doesn't mean unimportant by secondary but it means such issues caused by crisis consequences, they do not contain factors of crisis continuity. Decisions that were made by The UN for controlling creating and aggravating factors have not been in line with crisis expansions. This inadequacy is due to 1) lack of continuous field monitoring and, 2) not controlling effective foreign forces on the crisis.

5.2.1. The UN: Interruption in monitoring field status

Three monitoring mechanisms have been set up for observation of field condition by The UN: independent international commission of inquiry about Syrian Arab Republic, UN supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), and Joint Investigation Mechanism Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and The UN called JIM. Monitoring here means receiving a set of information related to the field condition of the crisis continually and directly; such that a clear image of the process of the crisis in both operating and strategic levels is [71]. By applying mentioned mechanisms two characteristics that is, continuity and immediacy in receiving field information faded away.

Independent international commission of inquiry was the first monitoring system established by the Human Rights Council based on resolution S-17/1 to investigate all claims on violation of human rights in August, 22nd, 2011. Since the commission has been set up, 20 reports on human rights conditions in Syria have been prepared by the commission. For making the reports more than 8000 witnesses and victims who lived in camps and hospitals of neighboring countries were interviewed [72]. Making calls via phone and Skype with resided individuals also was utilized to record reports in Syria. A considerable point about the commission was that its experts were not allowed to be in Syria from the beginning of their mission in 2011 [73]. Lack of direct monitoring field events made reports encounter problems in terms of verification and revealing the truth in civil war.

Unlike the human rights research committee, based on resolution 2042, UNSMIS mission was inside Syria directly, a team of up to 30 unarmed military observers to monitor parties to observe field status of ceasefire among hostile forces. Observers' mission was monitoring ceasefire but by escalating violence they were in danger; therefore, the mission was not fulfilled completely. Based on reports, the team was attacked at least 10 times directly [74]. During the second period of the mission in July the team members decreased to half by Ban Ki-moon's request. When the situation in Syria became worse, monitoring ended up on August 19th, 2012.

After successful cooperation between The UN and OPCW on disarming Syria of its chemical weapons, it was expected future cooperation of these two organizations in the form of Joint Investigation Mechanism called JIM have desirable results but expectations were not satisfied. In the human rights monitoring plan, information was not available directly. The Ceasefire monitoring plan encountered some problems when conflicts were intensified and in JIM, lack of political consensus ended the plan. Russia criticized the structure of JIM after attributing the chemical attacks in Khan-Shaykhun to Damascus. In the meeting held by the Security council that Russia vetoed JIM, Kremlin representative claimed this mechanism has acted as a puppet for Western states [75]. Consequently, the third monitoring mechanism was stopped.

5.2.2. The UN: The lack of control over crisis escalating forces

As it was mentioned in crisis typology, presence of cross-border (state and non-state) actors is one of the important political characteristics of the crisis that intensified it. Effective role of regional countries and proxy competition among trans-regional powers (direct and indirect) acted as an obstacle to reduce political tensions and provide Syrian people's demands.

No mechanism can be found for stopping, reducing or even condemning foreign states' intervention in the crisis by reading resolutions, recommendations, and measures taken by The UN. However, some concerns have been expressed such as A/RES/70/234 and A/RES/69/189 on foreign involvement in the Syrian civil war for supporting Syrian government (such as Quds forces and Hezbollah) and also resolution SC/11520 by Security Council on foreign terrorists, states actor have remained immune to the organization's recommendations and decisions. Gradual increase in the involvement of foreign actors is one of undeniable facts in Syrian civil war. Accordingly, as time passed, state actors could increase their activities and make the crisis deadlier and complicated.

During the first two years of the crisis, The U.S.A supplied the Free Syrian Army with non-military aid [76]. In September, 2013 $ 1 billion was spent by The U.S.A, $250 million spending on training and equipping rebels [77]. Since 2014, The U.S entered the military phase by sending weapons, military forces, and air attacks. Based on Pentagon statistics, nearly 15000 air attacks occurred by The U.S until 2018 [78]. Missile strike on Shayrat Airbase in 2017, Homs and Damascus in 2018 can be included in the list, too. On the other hand, during the first years of the crisis, Russia only sent weapons and informational aids to Syria [79] but its extensive military interventions against anti-government forces began in September, 2015, accordingly Russia became the main entity in Syrian civil war [80]. Regional actors had a role in qualitative and quantitative increase in conflicts. Turkey is a blatant example. Initially Turkey sheltered Syrian refugees but by worsening the situation in Syria caused by victories of Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG) in North, Turkish armed forces began a direct military intervention into Syria. In this regard, Turkey launched operations "Shah Euphrates" in 2015, "Euphrates shield" in December 2016, and "Olive Branch" in January, 2018. Iran involvement in Syrian civil war also increased gradually. Iran initially provided significant support for the Syrian government by technical aids and intelligence assistance [81]. From 2012, Iran helped Syrian military with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and radar equipment to bombard rebellious forces's positions [82]. Iran also organized many Shia militias such as Hezbollah, Liwa Fatemiyoun (Afghan Shia militias), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (Iraqi Shia militias), Liwa Zainebiyoun (Pakistani Shia militias) accompanied by Revolutionary Guards and army rangers of Iran to battle Syrian opposing forces. In 2016, Iran allowed Russian bombers to use Hamadan state Airbase (Noje air base) for bombarding Syria [83]. In 2017, Iran also fired medium-range ballistic

missiles at ISIS positions in Deir ez-Zor [84]. Although there is no valid database on the rate of foreign aids to different Syrian groups during the conflict, direct military movements of other countries such as Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, France, England, and other countries in the form of operations by international coalition against ISIS and operation Combined Joint-Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) have been in place since 2014 (Nearly 20000 air attacks happened). Despite these attacks being called the most accurate, thousands of civilians were injured or killed [85].

5.3. Qualitative evaluation of crisis management of Syria by The UN

Whereas time of decision-making is vital in crisis, it can be founded that one-year break can deprive the opportunity to manage the crisis with such violent conflicts. For monitoring field events of civil war in Syria, The UN has tried to take action by adhocratic mechanisms. Presence of experts in groups, shortness of structural life-cycle, decentralization, outsourcing, limited task description and contingent liability are all a reflection of characteristics of organization administrative management that express features of adhocratic management in Syrian civil war. Although based on Toffler, the famous American futurist, adhocratic mechanisms caused by organizational requirements in reaction to crises and complicated issues are seen [86], they do not eliminate its inherent defects especially inside a complex bureaucratic organization such as The UN. Whereas success of management based on adhocratic arrangements can be seen in emerging organizations especially IT companies (such as Google), efficacy of such method in complicated bureaucratic organizations such as The UN is questioned. What is obvious about monitoring measures taken by The UN in all levels is discontinuity and impossibility of immediate observation of field events. Besides two above mentioned factors, lack of control over foreign interveners is another reason why The UN is not able to take effective measures to manage the crisis. Lack of delegitimizing about unilateral measures by influential countries in the crisis made deepness (quality) and expanse (quantity) of foreign interventions increase. Monitoring taken measures by two global powers, The U.S.A and Russia, and regional countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries show that by considering definition of "The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction" [87]. Lack of controlling driving forces of the crisis made the crisis become a disaster gradually that this influenced natural models of life largely, then it led to catastrophe by eliminating effective aids in some regions.

As it can be seen in terms of effectiveness and reducing the scope of the crisis taken measure by The UN have ended in failure, it has not been able to follow its ideal objectives. It can be said that some mechanisms for reducing the crisis such as the USA-Russia ceasefire proposal were followed outside The UN mechanisms. Concerning the main question of the current study that is finding the reasons for The UN failure in achieving its ideal objectives in Syria, disorder in decision-making that has emerged as organizational goal displacement in crisis management can be mentioned. Organizational goal displacement happens when sub-objectives replace main objectives of organization [88]. The UN experienced disorder in decision-making because of 1. Conflict among informal groups of organization, 2. Oligarchic structure of formal organization, and 3. Environmental complexity of operation. They are discussed in the next section.

6. Conflict in informal organization

Parallel to formal structure, there is an informal structure in each organization where common values, norms, and procedures among members of informal groups are effective on organization efficiency [89]. The role of "political grouping" of members affects decision-making process in informal grouping of The UN. Although geographical proximity has an important role in political grouping of The UN members, political-economic desires of members affected it. Based on a report by The UN Information Centre, 17 political groups declared existence up to now [90]. Decision-making can be influenced by such groups. In a study done by Holcombe and Sobel [91] on The UN members' behavior in 8 political groups during 27 years it has been shown that how international coalition inside the organization have been in the form of voting blocs, consistent decision-making and frequent patterns. The reflection of such relative consistency can be seen in members' reaction to a special issue such as the crisis in Syria.

Based on made efforts to draw up drafts for making decisions on Syrian crisis and according to Dalton's idea on dividing informal groups, two informal groups including horizontal aggressive clique and vertical aggressive clique can be observed in The UN about civil war in Syria [92]. Here horizontal means alignment of group's members that is against vertical structure or hierarchy. Hence, Arabic, Atlantic, BENELUX and CANZ countries that formed informal organizations of opponents of the Syrian government. They via five ways including consensus building, developing a post-Assad transition strategy, developing drafts in chapter VII of UN charter, making effort to international delegitimizing of Damascus representatives, and recognizing Syrian oppositions try to prioritize "change Syrian regime" in The UN. Meetings held by a group called "Friends of Syria" in Tunisia 2012, Istanbul 2012, Paris 2012, Morocco 2013, Rome 2013, Amman 2013, and Doha 2013, in fact had been a meeting of members with coalition of Syrian opponents [93]. In all plans of The UN to deal with Syrian government, the presence of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Canada, The U.S.A, France, and some other countries can be observed.

On the other hand, horizontal aggressive clique consisted of countries called BRICS and Latin America proposed six axes including gradual reform of Syrian political structure, necessity to respect sovereignty and integrity in Syria, preventing punitive measures against Damascus, fighting against extremism, preventing foreign interventions and rebuilding of the country were propounded to deal with the crisis. Positions of this group towards Syria can be seen in common meetings in the form of parliamentary meetings of friends of Syria [94]. Countries of Latin America such as ALBA [95] and BRIC members [96] formed an informal group in nearly all meetings held by Security Council, General Assembly and human rights council which tried to block aggressive initiatives of former group and followed a coordinated voting pattern.

"conflict" is of high importance about informal groups of The UN in Syrian case. Conflict here means disagreement on perception of organization's duties, disagreement on interpretation of facts and disagreement on behavior expectation. Regarding the management of the Syrian crisis, conflict among informal groups have had a bad effect on organizational objectives in three levels of Task conflict, Relationship conflict, and Process conflict. Task conflict emerges when members disagree on the scope of practical tasks, process conflict arises from group disagreement on legal procedures of the organization, these conflicts disorganized the prioritization system and make decision-making process prolonged. Such a disorder made The UN unable to present a certain agenda for dealing with the crisis after months and after spreading conflict dimensions. In addition to above mentioned conflicts, relationship conflict provoked disagreements. Relationship conflict here means conflicts that are not related to main issue directly inside the organization but they are influenced by disagreements external to the organization that have a direct impact on worsening the conflict. Russia-Ukraine crisis, Iran Nuclear crisis, and regional competitions of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were of foreign shocks that influenced disagreement and conflict among informal groups of The UN.

7. Oligarchic structure of The UN
Michels believes that oligarchic structure is one of destructive features of large organizations in the 20th century, it can destroy consensus goals [97]. One of critical remarks on The UN regarding dealing with international crises is its undemocratic structure of decision-making. Structure based on centralization of power divided organization's members into two groups of shareholders with special rights and general participants despite emphasizing on equity in rights (in terms of sovereignty). Frequent vetoes by permanent members of The UN about the crisis in Syria raised from this oligarchic structure (Russia vetoed 11 resolutions on crisis in Syria). A considerable point about the oligarchic structure of the decision-making system of The UN is forming "vertical clique" that distorts organizational goals. According to De Mesquita and Smith [98], there is a positive and significant relationship between non-permanent members of the Security Council and its permanent members, especially The U.S.A in making decisions and the amount of financial aid. Russia and The U.S.A at top of the organizational power pyramid, as leaders of two main movements of proponents and opponents of Syrian government influenced crisis management and consequently organization objectives.

8. Intensifying uncertainty and blockage of decision-making
In addition to formal and informal characteristics of the organization that influence decision-making and pursuing the goal. Environmental complexities of the organization in the form of increasing effective factors on decision-making [99] can impact on pursuing main goals of the organization. During the Arab spring, The UN encountered a complicated security and political situation that caused some paradoxical behaviors. Infinitive violence and massacre of civilians in Libya led to The UN intervention. At first permanent members of the Security Council did not agree on how to deal with Muammar al-Gadafi, but after air attacks on civilians by Libya, the necessity to ban flights over Libya increased. The Libya crisis was a case that was dealt with from the beginning to end quickly and decisively by The Security Council. Libya crisis and humanitarian intervention using resolution 1973 was criticized by many countries especially Russia, it led to decrease in humanitarian intervention and supporting internal conflicts. In fact, criticizing the Security Council on Libya crisis was an unexpected reaction to a seemingly trustful procedure that led to adoption of conservation and being doubtful while making quick and decisive decisions. Punitive measures taken by The UN from imposing sanctions on Iraq, and oil-for-food program to give permission to military operation in Libya made the organization encounter negative consequences. Accordingly, ambiguity in effectiveness of made decisions gradually made the organization more conservative. After events in Libya the organization reduced cooperation with plans such as preemptive war (due to using chemical weapons), humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect. Presence of international actors and field-political complexity of the crisis has reduced predictability of crisis and consequences of possible decisions more than before; in fact, this exacerbation of uncertainty became one of environmental factors of reaction in organization's decision-making.

9. Conclusion
Inefficiency of The UN to deal with crises and fact-finding on effective factors on decision-making systems of The UN is often investigated in the framework of theories of international relations. Instrumental view to The UN in international affairs has decreased the opportunity for finding causes of successes and failures based on organizational context. According to Weber, if we consider The UN as a bureaucratic organization in form of a social institute, the UN is the

second association established in 1945 to maintain peace. An organization that has expanded a type of bureaucracy in international relations by its activities with different institutions and organizations. Nonetheless in literature there are a few studies based on organizational studies that investigated the function of The UN. Comprehending mechanisms of decision-making via interdisciplinary studies opens a new window for researchers. Based on Weber's theory, The UN can be compared to an ideal type of bureaucracy due to bureaucratic features such as hierarchy, division of labor, etc. Ideal type of bureaucracy is like an abstract model of an organization that is in its ultimate efficiency and productivity and can represent organization deviation in pursuing goals.

Due to having characteristics such as organized opposing forces, armed violence, Intention to overthrow the political system, continuity of conflict, and territorial occupation, Syrian civil war as the operating environment of the organization is categorized as a non-international conflict legally. Because of wide damage to infrastructures (economic crisis), prolonged internal intervention (sovereignty crisis), territorial occupation (penetration crisis), and millions of refugees (human crisis) made the state fail. Based on mentioned characteristics four ideal objectives for effective management of the crisis have been presented. These objectives are: 1. Providing the ground for national dialogue in the form of preventive diplomacy, 2. Aiding homeless and refugees, 3. Fact-finding on violators of armed conflicts right (violation of humanitarian law), and 4. Controlling destructive foreign interventions via delegitimizing unilateral measures of Third states.

Qualitative evaluation of The UN measures showed that this organization has not been able to manage destructive dimensions of the crisis due to 1. Delay in on time reaction, 2. Inadequacy of reactions to the crisis, 3. Interruption in direct field monitoring (due to using defective adhocracy monitoring system), and 4. Lack of delegitimizing of destructive measures by Third states not able to manage the crisis. As time passed the crisis became a catastrophe. Failure of organization to achieve its ideal goals, compared to ideal bureaucracy, is due to goal displacement. Because of conflict among informal organizations, oligarchic structure of formal organization, intensifying environmental complexities, and increase in unreliability of correct predictions on future change, The UN encountered some problems in its decision-making system. It is obvious that if the formal structure of the organization does not change to make the decision making system a democratic one and informal organizations do not agree on their perception of the organization duties and facts of organizational environment, there will be no hope for such a bloody crisis to be managed efficiently.

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