

# DEREK PARFIT'S NOTION OF PRACTICAL REASON

Reena Kumari\*

\*Research Scholar, School of Philosophy and Culture, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra, J&K, India, Email: [16dpc001@smvdu.ac.in](mailto:16dpc001@smvdu.ac.in)

## Abstract

Practical reason is a rational capacity of human mind which is employed to perform certain act in particular ways. It is moreover characterized as both a capacity to respond to the situations as well as guiding principles of certain acts. Derek Parfit remarks that reason is indefinable yet understandable through instances. It is ability that gives us enormous knowledge and with the help of this ability we can do something, to have some needs, emotions such as fear, be unhappy and trust. This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of Practical and Epistemic Rationality. But it might seem impossible to do because one depends upon features of the situation and other depends on agent's point of view. In both of these theories different beliefs about reasons and it can be explain with the Casual connection between the Rational Beliefs with Rational Desires. The work also explores how the rationality of our acts as well as desire based on our different belief of life. In Derek Parfit's point, there is a causal relation between desires and acts that depends on our beliefs. We will act according to our desires because in this act our beliefs involved. This objective about rational or irrational beliefs can be explained through the idea of practical reason by Parfit perspectives.

**Key words:** reason; practical reason; epistemic reasons; normative reasons; beliefs; desires

## 1. Introduction

The term "practical reason" is used for a reflective facility for the course of action in a given situation of life. When our reason for many desires or aims, then we have done an action to do something. To attain this aim, then we call practical. In Derek Parfit point of view, practical reason is given by facts in the actual state of affairs. The main objective of this paper is that through rationality how we will act or decide about rational or irrational acts about beliefs of our life. In our daily life, we face different situations, and in every encounter, we come across a variety of the options to choose a course of action from them. To exercise our choice correctly, we assess the available options and choose the correct ones by employing practical reason. Practical reason guides us to choose the most viable and rationally defensible path to our objective. Reflective consideration enables us to arrive at decisive and executable reasons. Thus, practical reason not only provides justification for our choices but also motivates us to undertake suitable actions. Consideration of this kind is practical in at least two senses:

- (1) In terms of its subject matter, and
- (2) In terms of its consequences

A practical reason is practical in virtue of its intimate relationship with action which constitutes its subject matter. Also, it necessarily considers the expected outcomes of action for the purpose of viability and evaluation of the same. A practical reason is characterized as both a capacity to respond to the situations and as normative principles for the assessment. The function of practical reason is called practical reasoning which is described as an inferential process through which justification is offered in terms of reasons drawn from the compelling facts of life. The choice of action or decision is determined with due consideration to the facts of life.

In Derek Parfit's point of view, we are the creatures that can comprehend and react to reasons.<sup>1</sup> From this capacity, we have gained incredible learning and capacity toward direct the eventual fate of existence lying on Earth. We might even subsist the main balanced creatures in the Universe or rational beings of this universe. In our daily life, we have any reason to think something, to achieve something, to have some aim or desire, and to have numerous different states of mind, for example, fear, unhappy, and expectation. Reasons are specified by facts, for example, that somebody's fingerprints be on the weapon, or so as to calling a doctor to save somebody's living. When we have a reason for some beliefs than we can call theoretical. When our reason to have many desires or aim, and we will do something to attain this aim, then we call practical.

Reasons are given by facts.<sup>2</sup> Reasoning is a mental process of drawing a conclusion from certain accepted truths. It is also used to offer some justification or reason in support of certain claims or deeds. This ability of the human mind is essential for survival. A deficiency in reasoning makes us vulnerable. Apart from the service to survival, reasoning strengthens our cognitive capacity to gain knowledge beyond sensory access. Moreover, this rational capacity enables us

---

<sup>1</sup> Reason is the faculty our thinking that consciously making sense of thinking, facts, institutions etc. It also refers with rationality of human being.

<sup>2</sup> Parfit. (2011), On what matters .pp.111.

to decide what to do in a certain situation and what not to do. For example, in the process of cultivation, a farmer reasons to know about the quality of seeds, the fertility of the land, which season is suitable for plant, what to plant, when to plant it, how to sustain it, when to collect it, and how to get nourishment from the harvest. Reasoning as a piece of decision making in the terms of objective, institution, belief, tradition, attitudes and therefore in this way the limit with regards to flexibility and self-assurance. In every situation, we will give through the power of reasoning and in the complex situation we will weight of reason and the more valuable or weight able reason we will prefer for a better life. We are rational beings and we would need rationally otherwise act relies based upon our beliefs. But someone confident belief upon the appropriate, what we believed about situation and reason have given facts, if it will be true and gives us some reason then Derek Parfit called these beliefs, truth because truth beliefs give us some reason. That such belief gives us an apparent reason. According to Parfit's when such beliefs are true, then this apparent reason is also a real reason. If in these beliefs our inferential process or our supposition includes and we are not consciously aware, but from that supposition action not harm ourselves or other people. When our mind in an ignorant state or contain false beliefs, this might be rationally used for us to wish for, or do, what we have not any motivation toward want or do. For react by the apparent truth we ought rationally, but our beliefs are false then these reasons will not be real. It starts through Parfit's critique of Kantian ethics in section 2. The causal connection between in rational beliefs with rational desires in Section 3 respectively. In Section 4, explain the difference between practical and epistemic rationality. In Section 5, explain the objective and subjective practical reasons for action. And in 6 Section draws the conclusion of this paper.

## **2. Parfit's critique of Kantian ethics**

Derek Parfit, a British philosopher known for his work in ethics and personal identity, engaged with Immanuel Kant's ethical philosophy in his seminal work "Reasons and Persons" (1984). Parfit's discussion on Kantian ethics primarily focuses on Kant's notion of the categorical imperative and its implications.

One central aspect of Parfit's engagement with Kant lies in his exploration of the concept of rationality and moral obligation. Kant argues for the existence of moral duties that are binding on all rational beings, which he formulates through the categorical imperative. This imperative demands that one should act in accordance with principles that could be willed to be universal laws, without contradiction. Parfit scrutinizes Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative and raises objections. One notable critique is Parfit's concern with the possibility of conflicting duties derived from Kant's principle. He argues that Kant's emphasis on the universality of moral laws might lead to situations where one could not fulfill all moral duties simultaneously, resulting in a conflict of obligations.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, Parfit delves into the notion of personal identity and its implications for Kantian ethics. He explores how Kant's emphasis on the rational nature of beings might be challenged by modern understandings of personal identity, particularly those that question the coherence of the self over time. While Parfit's critique of Kantian ethics is substantial, he also acknowledges the enduring influence and importance of Kant's moral philosophy. Parfit's engagement with Kant contributes to the ongoing discourse on ethical theory and the quest for understanding the nature of moral obligation and rational agency.

Derek Parfit's critique of Kantian ethics, particularly as presented in his influential work "Reasons and Persons" (1984), can be summarized in several key points:

**The Formula of Universal Law:** Parfit raises concerns about the clarity and applicability of Kant's Formula of Universal Law, which states that an action is morally permissible if its maxim (the principle behind the action) can be consistently willed as a universal law. Parfit suggests that determining whether a maxim can be universalized may not always provide clear guidance in morally complex situations. Additionally, Parfit points out that some maxims may pass the universalizability test but still lead to morally problematic outcomes.

**Conflicting Duties:** Parfit argues that Kant's emphasis on the universality of moral duties can lead to situations where one is faced with conflicting duties. For example, a person may have a duty to tell the truth in a given situation but also have a duty to prevent harm, and these duties may conflict with each other. Parfit suggests that Kantian ethics lacks a mechanism for resolving such conflicts or providing guidance on how to prioritize conflicting duties.

**The Role of Consequences:** Parfit criticizes Kantian ethics for its strict focus on the moral worth of actions based on their adherence to duty, rather than considering the consequences of actions. He argues that there are cases where actions that violate Kantian moral principles may produce better overall consequences and thus be morally preferable. Parfit's critique challenges Kant's deontological approach, which prioritizes duty over consequences.

**The Nature of Rationality:** Parfit questions Kant's assumption that rationality alone is sufficient to ground moral obligations. He suggests that Kant's conception of rationality may be too narrow and fails to account for other important factors that influence moral decision-making, such as empathy, compassion, and social context.

**Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility:** Parfit's work on personal identity challenges traditional notions of selfhood and raises questions about the implications for moral responsibility. He argues that Kant's emphasis on the

<sup>3</sup>Matthias Hoesch and Martin Sticker.2021:pp.14-32

rational nature of beings may be at odds with contemporary understandings of personal identity, which suggest that the self is not a fixed entity but rather a fluid and interconnected process.

Overall, Parfit's critique of Kantian ethics highlights some of the limitations and challenges inherent in Kant's moral philosophy, particularly in its application to real-world moral dilemmas. While acknowledging Kant's contributions to ethical theory, Parfit's work encourages further exploration and refinement of ethical frameworks that can better address the complexities of moral decision-making.

Let's illustrate some of Derek Parfit's critiques of Kantian ethics with a hypothetical scenario:

**Scenario:** Imagine a situation where a person, let's call her Sarah, is faced with a moral dilemma. Sarah's friend, Alex, has confided in her about a plan to cheat on an important exam. According to Kantian ethics, Sarah has a duty to uphold moral principles, such as honesty and respect for others' rights. Kant would argue that lying is inherently wrong because it violates the categorical imperative - it cannot be willed as a universal law.

Now, let's consider Parfit's critiques:

**Conflicting Duties:** Sarah's duty to tell the truth may conflict with her duty to prevent harm. If Sarah tells the truth and informs the authorities about Alex's plan, she may prevent academic dishonesty but potentially harm her friend's academic and personal reputation. On the other hand, if she remains silent to protect her friend, she violates the duty of honesty. Parfit points out that Kantian ethics does not provide clear guidance on how to prioritize conflicting duties in such situations.

**The Role of Consequences:** From a Kantian perspective, lying is always morally wrong, regardless of the consequences. However, Parfit might argue that there could be situations where lying could produce better overall consequences. For instance, if Sarah believes that revealing Alex's plan would lead to severe repercussions, such as expulsion from school or damage to their friendship, she might argue that lying to protect Alex's confidentiality could lead to better consequences in terms of minimizing harm.

**The Nature of Rationality:** Parfit questions whether Kant's emphasis on rationality alone is sufficient to ground moral obligations. In this scenario, Sarah's decision might not solely be based on rational considerations but also on her emotional connection to her friend, her empathy towards Alex's situation, and her understanding of the social context in which the dilemma arises. Parfit suggests that Kantian ethics may overlook these important factors that influence moral decision-making.

This scenario demonstrates how Parfit's critiques of Kantian ethics apply to real-world moral dilemmas, where adherence to moral principles may not always provide clear guidance and where the consideration of consequences and other factors may be necessary to make ethically sound decisions.

### 3. Casual connection between the Rational Beliefs with Rational Desires

The main question raised in this section is how the rationality of our acts as well as desire based on our many beliefs of life. In Derek Parfit's point, there is a causal relation between desires and acts that depends on our beliefs. We will act according to our desires because in this act our beliefs involved. But there are many desires that will depend on irrelevant beliefs. For example, someone asked at Sunday I will not study anything because my beliefs are about it is good for my health. This kind has desire depend on irrelevant belief because this belief is not justifiable. In this situation, if he/she gives a reason for Sunday I will not study any book because I am going shopping or for a temple. While that desire gives us a rational replies toward what he/she believes and also be justifiable with beliefs<sup>4</sup>. Through Hume suggestion, 'just when these desires causally depend on false beliefs. But false beliefs can be rational, and so can desires that depend on false beliefs'<sup>5</sup>.

When our desire causally depends on irrational belief then our desires are also irrational. To evaluate this view take one example that John wants to drink wine because he wants to protect his health and his belief that drinking wine is a most effective way to protect my health or for my well being. John has an irrational belief because of his uncle drunk until he was healthy and aged 90, and from this reason, John takes this fact to outweigh that drinking protects his health like his uncle. To improve things, he wants to drink only because he will take pleasure in living and also trust drinking make longer his living. Does the irrationality about his belief construct his desire to intoxicate irrational? The rationality of the belief does not make our desires rational or irrational on which that desires have causally dependent, if the substance of that beliefs, otherwise what we will accept. Even John beliefs about drinking will save his life and his desire to drink is rational. He wills wanting that he has a strong reason for drinking because his belief was true. Assume rather that John wanted to drink because he had a rational belief about drinking injure my health. On the see that we are currently talking about since his desire about drinking that beliefs have rational, this desire would be judicious. This one is obviously false. That one is false or irrational because he wants to drink for the damage his health. If we practically have seen that keep harm to own health or other is not rational thought. If our desire is irrational beliefs that result would be irrational. Some people protest that when we saying that various desire or act is 'irrational' it means this desire or act based on

<sup>4</sup> In Beliefs something that accepted is true on the basis of factual knowledge. It can be different from desired based reason. Desired based reasoning is individual process and not factual.

<sup>5</sup> Parfit. 2011:pp.113-114

various irrational beliefs. Derek Parfit cannot reject this case that our wants or acts are irrational when it will base upon irrational beliefs. Be that as it may, we should, to use 'irrational' in its usual sense, to an expressive analysis we will use this kind of words like 'silly', 'stupid' and 'ridiculous'.

Another reason to reject this view that our irrational acts and desires causally depend on irrational beliefs. Assume that, since I accept both that

(1) Drinking protects John's health

And that

(2) John is now drinking,

He believes that

(3) John is now protecting his health.

Belief in (3) might be irrational since this belief depends on John's irrational belief in (1). In an additional way, however, John's belief in (3) is rational. His belief rationally is run through beliefs in (1) as well as (2) as within, if these some other beliefs are right, it would be given him a decisive reason for belief in (3). In this way, a number of belief is rationally based on some extent whether this one belief is rationally given by some of our other beliefs and these different beliefs are rational. So, the Rationality of everyone's beliefs based on other things, for example, this belief's relation with our perceptual experiences. Be that as it may, when connected to many of our beliefs. In the next section of this paper related rational beliefs with a practical point of view rationally.

#### **4. Practical and Epistemic Rationality**

In epistemic reason, our acts and desire are irrational when we are deteriorating to take action to a number of epistemic or apparent reasons. Our action would be irrational when John's belief in drinking will protect his health. Be that as it may, that's one would be ambiguous toward telling John action practically irrational, because his mistake is merely his default to react on his epistemic reasons. According to Derek Parfit's when if someone's belief is epistemically irrational, that irrationality can be reasonably and beneficially professed to be innate by whatever other conviction to facilitate relies upon these beliefs. In any case, it is not worth asserting that someone's belief's irrationality is may be inherited through any other desire or action that is done by someone depends on these beliefs. In other words, we can say that when someone's epistemic irrational beliefs then we can say that these irrational beliefs can be like a virus, infect our other beliefs should be there or not. We can be called our desire and act irrationally only when we are fading to act in response to understand as well as sturdily decisive practical reason or apparent reasons nothing to have that desire, or act within that way.

The rationality of beliefs based on truth related reason or apparent reason or epistemic reason. Our act and desire based on rational beliefs and we act in that rational ways, we have to respond better in the direction of practical reasons or apparent reasons to have these desires and act in a practical way. We will take action well to set of reasons or apparent reasons. We will be practically rational but epistemically irrational, or practical irrational but epistemically rational. If we are will act practically rational than we be will achieve some rational aim. Every action that we act based on practical reason or apparent reason is related to voluntary acts and our non-voluntary act related headed for epistemic reasons. The debate between voluntary and non-voluntary acts that will be lead to the aspects of practical and epistemic reasons for living. Voluntary acts<sup>6</sup> in general understanding known to be as the tasks that we (human beings) performs on the basis of achieving one or the other goal like to participate in the national festivals are the attainment of respecting the national enthusiasm among the nation. While the non-voluntary acts are defined as the acts that would perform by the consciousness or on the epistemic reasons of the social order. Like to follow the cultural, aesthetic, social, etc norms are all non-voluntary acts that will be considered as our beliefs. So, the former is the achieving of goal and the later is based on norms or rituals. From the above point, we can say that there is a difference between epistemic reason and practical reason.

We are demanding to achieve the truth it is an activity. To find out the truth for that we will engage for practical reasons. For example, in mathematics, we may use practical reason to verify some proof, to check out the result of some previous calculation. In another sense, there are many rules and beliefs from that we can reach the truth of life but sometimes according to the situation, we can take a decision. This decision-making situation is based on practical reasons for an agent. This practical reason is related to the normative aspect of life because it will right in the situation. In that way, 'Normative reasons called reasons as good bases (RGB), according to which a normative reason for you is something that is a good basis for doing action'.<sup>7</sup> In (RGB) makes good sense of the weight of reason. For example, If you will save someone life by thronging rope. According to (RGB) Thronging rope is normative fact from that reason you will save someone life. When we should pick between various conceivable acts, our reasons may struggle, and they can contrast in what we can describe their power, quality, or on the other hand weight.

---

<sup>6</sup> *Voluntary act* is used for an *action* that ends from the freedom of will.

<sup>7</sup> Gregory.2016:pp.2291-2310

If I will enjoy the taste of mushroom the I will important reason to eat this but my doctor advised me from that kind of food is a strong reason of your death, so I have weightier reason to not to eat mushroom because from this I will die. The normative reason is for acting because it favors someone act. It derives from the idea that there are norms, principles, and codes that impose actions right and wrong. To take a cultural example when we will meet someone for the first time we shake hands and in Indian culture younger meet their elder wishes them in form of 'Namaste' and Touch their feet's. The existence of these norms depends on the variety of logical and natural relations, rules and regulations. Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when agents reason to the best of their ability, and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, they sometimes get things wrong. Dominant theories<sup>8</sup> about reasons for action argue that all good, or 'normative', reasons for acting are objective normative reasons. But objective normative reasons for action are derived from facts about the world that ignore certain facts about human agents. On these accounts of reasons, real human agents can be unable to learn what they have normative reason to do. A common response to this problem is to say that in such situations people act in a praiseworthy way, but their actions are based on false beliefs, and false beliefs cannot be good reasons. In this way when agents reason to the best of their ability and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, agents act appropriately in response to states of the world that are normative reasons for action.

In another way, our desires and actions are aimed at good and beliefs aimed at truth. But Derek Parfit unlike the concept good and true is not normative. Furthermore, truth and falsity are less complex than what is important, in something like the manner by which red, white, black and green is simpler colors than the chromatic colors. Nobody question that there are non- normative truths, for example, the truth about the world or about logic and mathematics but there are disagreements about that which type of facts that give us epistemic reasons. In any case, numerous people question about there are normative truths and there is much difference about what makes a difference. There is a natural selection that have to arrange would have us to beliefs whether true or not. In that way there are many attitudes can be changed with the time of different conditions. Think about first an expected man whose attitudes are different from this Tuesday to another next Tuesday. That man can only take cares about own future well being, this strange attitude would not depend on ignorance. If he is suffering from pain on Tuesday and next Tuesday just as same pain and this man ordeal accepted the irrational belief that our future on Tuesday is the same as last Tuesday. But practically it was not true because factual knowledge does not give us these types of irrational beliefs. So, this person preference is strongly different from reason or irrational.

### **5. Objective and Subjective Practical Reasons for Action**

The 'desire' word regularly related to our physical desires or in the direction of those things from which human being attracted. Desire is the attraction of something by sensual appealing. In Derek Parfit's point of view word, 'desire' within an extensive sense, which related with to any state of a human being motivated or needing somewhat to occur and we have willing to get it. But the words 'want' in both ways have good judgment or sense. Our desire from which we have got or fulfilled our want have been objecting based and that object be all the events in the sense which contain acts, process and the actual state of people affairs.

In Derek Parfit's objectives theories<sup>9</sup> our desire is telic. Desire is telic when most of the events are as an end, intended for personal sake. When someone wants events for its own sake it means our desire can be instrumental because wants this event must have caused some other events that we have a desire. When someone acts or an event is together or had an end and that means to achieve a number of other ends. At that time when we have achieved an end to fulfill desire's that fulfillment one of our great aims.

In our daily life, we have a long chain of instrumental desires. Our every desire is based on some ends and that is for another batter ends but these chains all are starting with a number of telic desire. For example, I might want to purchase more books, this one does not for its own sake but only for gaining knowledge so that I will share my knowledge to other and set an example of ideal man or women. After death people will your example in good work. So, this can lead to posthumous fame and name. That type of desire is merely instrumental desire, be that as it may, on the off chance that I need after death notoriety for the wellbeing of its own; this telic want would start this specific chain. In that way, all the wants that will be rational can verify by practical reason and attain the chain of instrumental desire There are two primary sorts of view about what Derek Parfit's will identify practical reasons. As per one gathering of perspectives, there are sure about facts that will be given reason to both aims and desires, and to do whatever might accomplish these points. When we will want to achieve this desire and aims that reasons are given by the facts about objects of aims. Instead, we can call this one reason is an object- given reasons. Those people accepted that all practical reason is of that kind, so that people are objectivists about reasons and who believe in the objective theory. Object specified reasons are given by facts that certain result appeal preventing or made for its personal sake. These reason giving facts create these outcomes superior or terrible for particular people. In that way, we will be a call that objective theories as value-based. This value-based reason given weight to our reason in the practical situation of life. Someone give more expensive dress and one day you will wear that dress and go outside the house, there was a pond near to your house. And you have seen

---

<sup>8</sup> Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto founder of dominant theory.

<sup>9</sup> Parfit. 2011.,pp.44-43

a little child drowning in it. At that time you will not care about dress and saved the life of the child and get your expensive dress muddy. At this condition fact about the weight of reason enter. Because at that time of a person have weight about his expensive dress and life of the child. In both reason the more valuable or weighable reason is to save the life of a little child is more important as compared to the reason for the expensive dress. However, comparison of value or weight about to save the child life, disvalue of the expensive muddy clothes place insignificance. This theory is about value-based that is firstly concerning with ethical theory. From the upper example, we can say that if some action valuable to a situation of interaction, that valuable fact has to be reasonably used for us toward act thing, then the weight of that valuable reason raising the amount of its value. The value-based belief of reasons gives a correct reason for our motivational reason to give donations towards others, to peruse or read great books, to go to celebrations. The most imperative the donations effort, or the more marvelous celebrations, give the weights of our motivational reasons to take on great interest.

Another type of practical reason is a subject-given reason. When someone reason for acting is all given through, or depend on, certain facts about what might be satisfied or fulfill our present desires or aims. Most of these theories demand to our real present desires. When we will fulfill our present desires or to the decisions that we will now make if carefully measured all the relevant facts. We asked these reasons are subject given reason in which all facts about us for fulfilled present desires. In that way when we will assume that every practical reason is of this kind, then we are subjectivists about reasons. These both kinds of theory are different from each other. According to the primary theory, there are many reasons for acting can be attained by the facts that a number of the act will be attained one of our aims. These reasons have drawn their force to the facts that will give our reason to had aimed. Those facts made these aims good. But according to subjectivist, there are not any reasons to contain our aims. Although it is real goodness that theory will give us reason like the sun gives us light. In Derek Parfit point of view if we think subjectivism is true that our choice is in the darkness.

Korsgaard writes

“Most things are good because of the interest human beings have in them. Objectivism reverses this relation. Instead of saying that what we are interested in is therefore good, the objectivist says that the goodness is in the object, and we ought therefore to be interested in it.”<sup>10</sup>

Both kinds of theories partially agree with each other. According to all probable objective theories someone has for support future well-being. Most people desire to promote our future well being, this one also implies to subjective theories have reason to act. Most people have different kind of desire that both kinds of practical theory inform us to fulfill this desire. Since these theories tell us what we desire or want something that is value achieving. Other more intense contradiction that we shall find that there is a decisive reason for to do something in the actual word or actual state of affairs, despite the fact that speculations of the other kind suggest that we have no motivation to do this thing, and there are not any decisive reason to do something. Furthermore, these two sorts of theory entirely differ about our reason to have our wants and points. Although, Derek Parfit’s must be accepted value-based and objective based theory of action (Parfit.2011). At these theories reason for our actions can develop their force by the facts that will give us reason to contain desire or aims. In responding to reason there is an unusual difference between the theories. When we act in some way that aware us that fact gave us a reason for the act, at that time we will respond to this kind of reason for acting. In that sense, we will act voluntary or free to act but our desire not to act in that way. The facts that give us reason better reason for some desire that reasons is rarely voluntary.

Comparative claims apply to our epistemic reasons for specific convictions or beliefs. When reasons are given by facts that are connected with the truth of beliefs, by logically applying this beliefs or evidence of these beliefs. When if someone sees clouds and infer about the rain, that reason gives us beliefs about there will be rain coming. Another example is that when we know that the weight of gold is more than lead, which gauges more than iron. These facts gave us a decisive reason that gold weighs more than iron. Decisive reason gives us a fact that to have some beliefs. Our reason responses are rarely voluntary. We could only sometimes decide not to accept what we have such conclusive reasons to accept. On the off chance that my envisioned autocrat undermines to kill me except if, one moment from now, I never again trust that  $2 + 2 = 4$ , I couldn't lose this conviction.

## 6. Conclusion

Although Parfit without any doubt accept the objective theory as an external theory, and the external reason is only an external reason. Our action will be rational when it depends on these reasons.

“If so many people believe that all reasons are provided by desires, how could it be true that, as I have claimed, no reasons are provided by desires? How could all these people be so mistaken?”<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Parfit.2011:p46

<sup>11</sup> Parfit, D.2001, “Rationality and Reasons”: pp17-39

Parfit's above mention value-based theory of practical reason is provided by facts about what is relevantly good or worth achieving. Reasons are given by facts and the rationality of our desires that will be depending upon beliefs. There will be a rational desire and act for practical reason in the actual state of affair. There will be not depending on the subjective reason for an act. For example, if someone tells me that his name was "Jimmy" then from this I have a normative reason that I have to call you "Jimmy". From this act, I have a motivating reason to identify you with Jimmy. This one only possible if have reason to call you Jimmy. Even if you are telling the lie that your name Jimmy, still I call you "Jimmy" because I have unaware with your lie. When we have known about the relevant facts about any issues through practical reason then act rationally. When someone has a wrong belief about that smoking tobacco is good for health but after some discovery by a scientist, it was proof that smoking tobacco is not good for health because from tobacco cancer occurs in human health. So, from the scientist point of view about tobacco is not good for health is a relevant and rational belief about not to smoke.

Parfit critiques Kantian ethics but still emphasizes the importance of rational decision-making. His concept of universalizability, though not identical to Kant's formulation, suggests that moral principles should be consistent and applicable to all rational beings. In real-world scenarios, individuals can apply this principle by considering whether the rules or principles they follow could be consistently applied in similar situations by others. For example, when making decisions in business or politics, individuals might consider whether their actions would be acceptable if adopted by everyone in similar positions. Parfit is concerned with reducing harm and promoting well-being. In practical terms, this principle can guide individuals and policymakers in making decisions that aim to minimize suffering and maximize positive outcomes for individuals and society. For instance, in environmental ethics, the principle of reducing harm might lead to policies aimed at mitigating climate change and protecting endangered species

### **Bibliography**

1. Audi, R (2004). Reasons, Practical Reason, and Practical Reasoning. *Blackwell Publishing*, pp121-149
2. David, V.J (1996). The Possibility of Practical Reason. *The University of Chicago Press* vol. 106, pp 694-726.
3. Gregory, A.(2015) 'Normative Reasons as Good Bases', *Springer Journal*, 2291-2310.
4. Hoesch, Martin Sticker and Matthias. "Parfit's Mixed Maxim Objection against the Formula." *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 2021: 14-32.
5. Parfit, D.(2011) *On What Matters*, 1st edn. Oxford: OUP.
6. Parfit, D.(2001) 'Rationality and Reasons' *Exploring Practical Philosophy, Essays In Honor of Ingmar Persson*, 17-39.
7. Parfit, D.(1984) *Reasons and Persons*, Clarendon : OUP.
8. Raz, J. (2014) 'Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons', *University Of Oxford Research Paper*, 14-428.
9. Williams, B. (1981), 'Internal and External Reasons', *Cambridge University Press*, 101-13.